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Peter H. van der Meer
SOM-theme A  Primary processes within firms

In this paper we investigate whether the amount and level of overschooling is higher in the
private sector than in the public sector. We investigate differences in the rate of return on
(over)schooling too. The idea is that within the public sector the wage and allocation process
behaves more according to Thurow’s job-competition model or according to the view of the
credentialists whereas in the private sector the wage and allocation process behaves more
according to the neo-classical human capital model. These differences should result in
different wage equations which if added up can explain the mixed results of previous research.
However, we could not find support for neither of these ideas in the Dutch Labour Supply
Panel Study of the Dutch Institute for Labour Studies (OSA). Contrary to our expectations
employees in the private sector were more often overschooled than those in the public sector,
but the rate of return on overschooling is the same. This means that none of the investments in
education is wasted and also that we have no substantial proof for credentials inflation as
advocated by others. The increase in the rate of return on schooling since 1985 shows that









In the now longstanding research about overschooling we see consistently that
overschooling is rewarding. Van der Meer and Glebbeek (2000) showed that in the
Netherlands the rate of return on schooling, overschooling and underschooling
increased between 1982 and 1998. And although the rate of return on overschooled
years is less than the rate for adequately schooled years, it is still positive. It also is
rewarding for those who are underschooled to increase their level of schooling. And
although there is some disagreement about the exact amount of overschooling and
about the estimated rate of return on the surplus years of schooling, it is a well-
established fact that this surplus still pays off. These are the major results of wage
equations specifically designed to test the job-competition model against the human
capital model.
Another result was that both the job-competition model and the human capital
model were outperformed by a matching model in explaining wages. However,
although a mixed model gives the best empirical results a definitive theoretical
explanation why such a model performs better has not yet been given. Several
explanations are at hand of which some have been tested. None of these explanations
takes into account that the wage and allocation processes differ between labour
market segments.
The main question we try to answer in this paper is whether the mixed results
of the wage equation can be explained by sector differences in the wage and
allocation process. Thereby we would like to distinguish between the public and the
private sector of the labour market. The idea is that within the public sector the wage
and allocation process behaves more according to Thurow’s job-competition model or
according to the view of the credentialists whereas in the private sector the wage and
allocation process behaves more according to the neo-classical human capital model.
These differences should result in different wage equations which if added up can
explain the mixed results of previous research (i.e. Hartog, 2000; Groot and Maassen
van den Brink, 2000; Van der Meer and Glebbeek, 2000).
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we theorise about
allocation processes on the labour market, making explicitly a distinction between the
private, i.e. profit sector, and the public, not-for-profit sector. On basis of these
theories we will draw two main hypotheses which will be tested further on in this
paper. The first main hypothesis is about the differences between the private and the
public sector with respect to the amount of overschooling and the wage equations,
while the second main hypothesis relates to the changes over time. In section three we
explicit our research methodology by describing the way in which we will test our
hypotheses. In the fourth section we present the data and the measurement of the
variables. In section five we present the results of the analyses and test our







The research into overschooling on the labour market was inspired by the enormous
increase in the educational level of the population. It was questioned whether the
labour market could absorb this enormous increase and whether all workers and
employees would and could use all the knowledge and skills they had acquired. In the
Netherlands Conen and Huijgen (1980, 1983) pioneered research into to the use and
requirements of labour skills and knowledge. They came to the conclusion that the
increase of human capital of the Dutch labour force was much more rapid than the
increase of the required skills and knowledge. They stated that the Dutch labour force
became overschooled and that some of the investments in education and schooling
might be wasted i.e. was not productive in the labour market. Asselbergh a.o. (1998)
repeated this research and came to the same conclusion.
This line of research was contested by labour market economists (cf. Hartog,
2000) who claimed that, according to human capital theory, the overschooled years
were still productive and that therefore the education was not wasted. Following
Sicherman (1991) they estimated wage equations which gave valuable insights. First
of all they showed that the overschooled years of the labour force were productive.
That is the rate of return on overschooled years was positive. However, overschooled
employees were not as productive as perfectly schooled employees were. That is the
rate of return on overschooled years was less than on required years of schooling.
Stated in other words, they found that of two employees performing on the same job
the one with the highest level of education earned more and that of two employees
with the same level of education the one performing on a lower job level earned less.
These results are contradicting both Thurow’s job-competition model and the
human capital theory. Thurow (1975) claimed that the productivity of an employee
was dictated by his job. So an overeducated employee could be no more productive
than a perfectly educated employee could and both should earn the same wages. The
human capital theory (Becker, 1964) states that wages are solely dependent on the
human capital of the employee and that in fact employees cannot be overschooled at
all. It is only their human capital that counts.
Hartog (cf. 2000) proposed a matching model to account for these mixed
results, which states that the productivity of an employee is both dependent on his
human capital as well as on his job. It is the combination, the match of characteristics
of job and employee that determines labour productivity. However, until now no
further evidence to support this matching has been put forward.
A different explanation of the mixed results lies at hand. It is well known
from sociological research that the labour market does not function as one big market
as most economists suppose. Doeringer and Piore (1971) as well as Stinchcombe
(1979) showed that the labour market can be divided into several segments, where
allocation of labour is organised differently. Some segments behave more according
to the ‘ideal’ competitive labour markets whereas other segments are not competitive
at all. In their view a wage equation for the entire labour market is the result of an
(weighted) addition of wage equations from the different segments. So it is
conceivable that the mixed results by Hartog and others is the result of adding up
markets which are ruled by Thurow’s job-competition model and competitive markets
where the human capital theory holds.
This is the more conceivable since Glebbeek (1993, p. 137) showed that the
classification made by Stinchcombe also proved to be valid for the Netherlands. Van
der Meer (1993), using different data, supported the view of Glebbeek. In this
research some segments behaved more according to the standard economic version of
the labour market while other segments did not so. Although according to the
research referred to more than two sectors can be distinguished in this paper we
restrict our selves to two sectors, a private and a public sector. The first reason for this
restriction is to keep things as simple as possible at this stage. A second reason is that
the distinction between the private and public sector is a very clear one, indeed. In the
Netherlands almost all private organisations seek to make a profit in competition with
each other, whereas most public sector organisations, including all educational and





In the private sector it is to be expected that employers feel pressure from competitors
and behave accordingly. This implies that an employee is paid according to his
(marginal) productivity. Also overschooled years, if present, are paid according to
this mechanism. If an employer does not pay for these productive characteristics of an
employee he or she will try to find a new job at another employer who will pay for
these extra years of schooling. At the other hand if an employer pays too much for the
overschooled years of his employee a cheaper competitor will take over the market
and put an end to this waste. Due to this competition we may expect that all human
capital invested in is paid for and that accordingly the wage and allocation processes
in the private sector can be explained by human capital theory.
Now, human capital theory says that persons invest in themselves to become
more productive (Becker, 1964). This increase in productivity increases also (labour)
earnings. Investment in primary, secondary and post secondary education increases
future earnings. Persons invest in these types of education until the marginal costs of
investment equals the marginal returns, or, to put it in other words, people maximise
the net present value of their investment. A basic assumption of the theory is a
competitive labour market where in equilibrium marginal productivity equals wages.
According to human capital theory more able persons invest more in human capital
because they have lower costs of investment (Ben-Porath, 1967). Therefore they also
will have higher earnings than less able people.
Besides investments in human capital before entering the labour market,
employees will invest in human capital through on-the-job training. By gaining
experience employees will increase their human capital and marginal productivity.
This gain will be larger in the early stages of someone’s career. Near retirement no
further investments will be made because (extra) labour earnings will halt. There is
simply no time left to recoup the investment.
Human capital theory explains earnings differential between persons by
differences in human capital. Higher educated and more experienced employees will
earn more than lower educated or less experienced employees will. The rate of return
on education and experience is the result of the interplay between demand and supply
on the labour market. In times of labour shortages the wages and rate of return on
education will increase, inducing more persons to invest in human capital and to enter
the labour market. In times of labour surpluses the rate of return on education will
drop, refraining people to invest in human capital and to enter the labour market
(Polachek and Siebert, 1993).
According to human capital theory there is no such thing as over- or
underschooling. The amount of schooling necessary to perform well on the labour
market is dependent on the relative supply and demand of educated employees.
Differences in productivity and wages can be accounted for by differences in the
amount of schooling and are independent from job characteristics, like years of
schooling necessary to perform well in the job. Two persons with the same amount of
human capital earn the same wages irrespective of the jobs they hold. If an amount of
over- or underschooling could be measured this would have no effect on the rate of
return on schooling. The rate of return on years of overschooling would be the same
as the rate of return on underschooling and the rate of return on years of schooling
necessary to the job (Sicherman, 1991; Oosterbeek, 1992). If employees have too
little formal schooling for the job this can be compensated by experience. Also
employees with too much formal schooling might have not enough experience. In
human capital theory it is not only the amount of formal schooling that determines the
wage, it is the total amount of human capital that matters. Other types of human
capital can compensate lack of one type of human capital. However the rate of return
on schooling should not be affected by the amount of over- or underschooling.
On basis of these considerations we do not expect to find much employees
that have too much formal schooling. The number of overschooled employees in the
private sector will be relatively low. On the other hand those who are overschooled in
the private sector will receive wages according to their attained human capital. We do
not expect a large difference between the rate of return on overschooled years of
employees and the rate of return on ‘required’ schooling. The first statement
concerning the amount of overschooling can be contested, but the second statement is
a hard prediction by the human capital theory. Rejection of this statement is a





Contrary to the private sector the public organisations do not compete with each
other, at least not on a for-profit basis. These public organisations do not feel
competitive pressure and can therefore allocate and reward their personnel in a
different way. Two more or less competing allocation mechanisms could be applied;
each leads towards different outcomes with regard to the rewards for overschooling.
The first mechanism is Thurow’s job-competition model, the second is allocation
based on credentialism (Collins, 1979).
In contrast with human capital theory, the job-competition model (Thurow,
1975) states that productivity and wages depend on the jobs, not on the persons who
hold these jobs. Persons are allocated over jobs according to their place in the labour
queue. The place in this labour queue depends on the costs employers must make to
train newly hired personnel to perform well. It is assumed that these training costs
depend on the amount of schooling already obtained by the (potential) employee.
Persons with a high amount of schooling are at the front of the queue while applicants
with no or little schooling are at the tail-end. Persons with the highest amount of
schooling get the most productive jobs. Persons with no or little schooling get no jobs
or the least productive ones. According to this model a positive association between
schooling and wages exists, too, but it is not necessary that two persons with the same
amount of schooling earn the same wages. Only when these two persons have the
same kind of jobs they will receive the same wages.
According to the job-competition model overschooling can exist. In times
when labour supply is abundant highly schooled employees will be hired in jobs that
need less schooling, because they are at the top of the labour queue. Therefore it is
possible that an employee has received more schooling than necessary to perform
well in a job. This surplus of schooling can be obtained prior to the labour market or
could be obtained in another job. Whatever the origin of overschooling, the job-
competition model predicts that this overschooling will not be rewarded. Only the
amount of schooling necessary to perform well on the job is rewarded. Because
productivity and therefore the wage depends on the job overschooling is not
rewarded. Overschooling does not increase productivity. The rate of return on
overschooling should therefore be zero.
We therefore expect to find more overschooled employees in the public
sector than in the private sector. However, contrary to the private sector this
overschooling is not rewarded in the public sector. This is a hard prediction by the
job-competition model.
With respect to the rewards for overschooling the credentialists come to a
different conclusion. Just as in Thurow’s job-competition model the credentialists
expect public sector employees to be overeducated more often than in the private
sector. Employees are hired on basis of their credentials of which their education is
the most important. Credentials and thereby education is seen as a positional good
(Hirsch, 1976) which should be paid for. These credentials are a prerequisite to the
job (Collins, 1979). The more education the better it is for the organisation, whether
these credentials are directly productive or not. In contrast with the job-competition
model the credentialists expect that the credentials of the public sector employees will
be rewarded. These rewards could even surpass the marginal productivity of these
employees. If this were true the rate of return on overschooled years would be higher







So with regard to the incidence and amount of overschooling we expect that this will
prevail in the public sector. Our first main hypothesis with regard to the rate of return,
or the rewards to, overschooling, is divided into three subtheses of which two
compete directly with each other. Firstly we expect that the rate of return on
overschooling in the private sector will be (almost) the same as the rate of return to
the required schooling. Secondly we expect that, according to the job-competition
model, the rate of return on overschooling in the public sector will be much lower
than in the private sector. Stated in other words we expect the rate of return to
overschooling in the public sector to be zero or at least substantial lower than the rate
of return to required schooling in the private sector. The opposing hypothesis
elaborated on the credentialist’s ideas is that the rate of return on overschooling in the
public sector is higher than in the private sector. This implies that the credentialists
expect the rate of return on overschooling to be higher than the rate of return on
required schooling, in the public sector. If the first hypothesis finds support by the
data this implies that also the rate of return to required schooling will be higher in the
public sector.
If the just stated theses are true, changes in overschooling and in the rate of
return on overschooled years in the overall labour market could, at least partially, be
explained by shifts in the shares of the public and private sectors. This is the second
main hypothesis we want to test. If the private sector has grown, in terms of jobs,
more rapidly than the public sector then overschooling should have diminished and
the rate of return on overschooling should be more in accordance with the rate of
return on required schooling. If the public sector has grown more rapidly we might
observe the opposite. The results also indicate whether market expansion, i.e. by





In order to test the hypotheses, outlined in the previous section, the amount of
overschooling has to be measured and its effect on wages has to be established. To
measure overschooling the required amount of schooling for a job has to be
established. Out of the four theoretically possible methods we choose to measure
overschooling with the help of job analysis. Job experts establish the level of
schooling, which is necessary to perform well on the job, which is compared to the
attained schooling of the employee. The job analysis presupposes a one to one
relationship between level of schooling and job level. In practice various methods of
job analysis are used. A famous source for this type of information is the dictionary of
occupational titles (DOT) in the United States (Miller et.al. 1980). In the Netherlands
Huijgen provided a key to code occupations into seven job levels, the ARBI-code
(Conen et.al., 1983).
Given the possibilities of our data this is the most valid method we can use.
Of what is known from studies about the validity of measures of overschooling the
job analysis method is quite valid and not outperformed by other methods. An
overview of methods measuring overschooling can be found in Halaby (1994), Groot
and Maassen van den Brink (2000) and Hartog (2000).
To estimate the rate of return on schooling and overschooling the following
regression, estimated with ordinary least squares, has become standard (Hartog,
2000).
ln   = γ0 + γ1r + γ2 so + γ3su  + βX + ε
with w = hourly wages
r = required schooling
so = attained schooling minus required schooling if attained schooling is
greater than required schooling
so = 0 else


su = required schooling minus attained schooling if attained schooling is less
than required schooling
su = 0 else
X = control variables
ε = error term
γ0 ,γ1, γ2,γ3,β= parameters to be estimated
If  γ1 = γ2 = -γ3 we have the Mincerian human capital wage equation1. The wage
depends only on attained schooling, that is only on employee characteristics and
every year of schooling gives the same rate of return. No negative effects of over- or
underschooling exist. We expect to find this result for the private sector. This would
support our first subthesis.
If γ2=γ3=0 only the required level of schooling has an effect on the wage. This
confirms the job-competition model of Thurow (1975) and would support our second
subthesis concerning the rate of return on overschooling in the public sector. On the
other hand if in the public sector γ2 > γ1 or γipublic > γiprivate we have found support for
our third subthesis. Than the credentialists explain the wage and allocation processes
in the public sector best.
Until now most studies (cf. Hartog, 2000), incorporating the entire labour
market, have found γ1>γ2>-γ3>0. The rate of return on required schooling is highest,
followed by the rate of return on overschooling, that is higher than the reward for
underschooling. This implies that overqualified employees receive a lower return on
their last year of schooling than employees with the required amount of schooling.
The penalty on underschooling is higher than the penalty on overschooling.
As stated in the previous section this mixed result can be explained by
different wage and allocation processes in the public and private sector. If our first
two hypotheses are confirmed we will the find the ‘common’ result for the entire
labour market. This ‘common’ result is than the weighted average of the rate of
returns for the public and private sector. The weights equal the share in the (active)
labour force. Changes in these shares can explain changes in the differences between
the rate of return on required schooling and overschooling. If the share of the private

sector increases the difference between the rates of return in the overall labour market
should decrease, while they increase when the share of the public sector grows.
However if the credentialistic view of the public sector is confirmed we are
unable to explain the ‘common’ results found by others. A weighted average of the
rates of return from the human capital model and the credentialistic model do not
converge to the overall result. If the credentialists are right the findings for the entire
labour market would confer to the human capital model, with rates of return
somewhere between those from the private sector and those from the public sector, or
we would see a higher rate of return on overschooling than for required schooling.
With what we know so far from research done in a variety of countries, this is highly
unlikely. However if the credentialists view is supported we have an even more
complicated puzzle in explaining the wage setting and allocation on the labour
market.
By comparing these estimates for a number of years we can infer if and how
the rate of return has changed, and how this is influenced by the shift in the shares of
the public and private sectors. Therefore it is necessary to estimate the same models
for several years, using the same (control) variables. This would provide us with an
answer to our research question.
# $		""
We have one main data source: the OSA Labour Supply Panel Study2. Of this panel
study we have access to the surveys held in 1985, 1986, 1988, 1994, 1996 and 1998.
This gives us estimates of the incidence and amount of over- and underschooling
during a period of thirteen years. These data give us a unique opportunity to analyse
the rate of return and change in rate of return on schooling and to compare the private
with the public sector. Because each wave of the panel study is a random sample of
the Dutch active labour force, it also gives us the opportunity to investigate the effects
of the shift in shares of the private and public sector.
Although the OSA-survey is a panel study we do not use this characteristic.
Each wave is treated as a separate cross-section. In each wave almost the same

number of persons were contacted. The sample sizes do not differ significantly
between the waves of the OSA panel study. Additional sampling combats attrition in
the OSA panel study. More information about the OSA-labour supply surveys can be
found in OSA (1989) and OSA (1997).
As mentioned in the previous section the level of required schooling is
measured with the job analysis method. In this study we use the coding of Huijgen
(see Conen et.al., 1983). Huijgen distinguishes seven different job levels. The
information used to code a job into one of these seven levels are the minimum
schooling requirements, the necessary amount of on-the-job training and the level of
discretion. The lowest job level consists of jobs for which no formal education is
required, on-the-job training is minimal and employees have no or minimal discretion
over their tasks. The highest job level requires scientific training. We use a key that
makes it possible to recode the four-digit job classification into Huijgen’s job levels.
We convert these job levels into necessary years of effective schooling, which we
compare with the attained years of effective schooling.
The highest attained level of education is converted into the effective years of
schooling. Each diploma or level of schooling is measured as the minimum years of
schooling necessary to obtain this diploma. This results in five levels of six, nine,
twelve, fifteen and seventeen years of schooling. Although small differences between
the surveys in the questions concerning the level of education exist the effective years
of schooling can be measured in a consistent way.
The match between required and attained level of schooling is shown in table
1. Everyone working on the lowest two job levels but who has more than six years of
schooling (primary education) is regarded as overschooled. Employees working on
job level three require nine years of schooling; employees working on job level four
require twelve years of schooling and employees on job level five require fifteen
years of schooling. All employees working on job levels six and seven are regarded as
underschooled if they have not obtained a university degree.

Table 1. The theoretical match between educational level and job level (0 perfect
match, - underschooled, + overschooled)
Years of schooling
Job level 6 9 12 15 17
1 0 + + + +
2 0 + + + +
3 - 0 + + +
4 - - 0 + +
5 - - - 0 +
6 - - - - 0
7 - - - - 0
Source: Asselberghs et.al. 1998, p. 17
Weekly, monthly and four weekly after-tax incomes are translated into hourly wages.
In the Netherlands after tax income, as specified on the wage slips and received on
bank accounts, is much better known than before-tax income. Therefore most surveys
ask after-tax income. More importantly after-tax income allows us to estimate the
private rate of return on schooling (Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1988), the effect we are
interested in.
The distinction between the private and public sector is based on the
information contained in the 1978 standard industrial code from Statistics
Netherlands. This code is based on the international SIC. Measured in a crude way all
employees working in a sector of which the first digit is a 9 (nine) can be seen as
working in the public sector. The main reason is that in the Netherlands all employees
in health care and education receive their wages directly from the government or from
government controlled agencies. However for this research we developed a more
sophisticated classification, following Glebbeek (1993, p.112). Included in the public
sector are those organisations that do not feel pressure from competition. It means
that besides the government we include the utility sector and private not-for-profit
organisations3.

As control variables we use number of years spend in the labour market.
Because we do not have exact measures in each wave, we approximate these years as
age minus years of attained schooling. We also include its square to control for non-
linear effects. Furthermore we control for being a married or non-married man or
woman. As a third control we use the natural logarithm of weekly hours worked.
Included in the analyses are those persons who are in paid employment4. Self-
employed and other persons in the labour market are excluded. We also restrict the
sample to those persons who worked a minimum of twelve hours per week. This
restriction conforms to the norms of the common Dutch definition of persons active in
the labour market. Finally we restrict the analysis to those persons who answered all
the relevant questions (list-wise deletion).
% !
In an earlier paper (Van der Meer and Glebbeek, 2000) we described the trends in
attained, required and overschooling for the entire Dutch Labour market. In the
presentation and discussion of our new results we will refer to this paper. The results
presented here might differ slightly from the results in Van der Meer and Glebbeek
(2000). Due to missing answers on the question where someone works the number of
persons included in the analysis differs somewhat. Especially in the 1986
questionnaire we have a lot of missings on industrial sector. However, including
industrial sector in the analysis has not led to significant changes in the results.
In tables 2 to 4 you can find the results of our analysis. In table 2 we report
the required and attained years of schooling while in table 3 we present the results on
the amount and incidence of overschooling in the labour market as a whole and in the
private and public sector separately. In table 4 we report the rate of return on
overschooling. The tables provide the information necessary to test our hypotheses.
In table 2 we see that for the Dutch labour market as a whole the level of
required and attained schooling increased between 1985 and 1998. The level of
required schooling increased from 11.1 years to 12.0 years. In this 13-year period the

level of required schooling grew on average with 0.6 per cent per year. In the same
period the attained level of schooling of the working labour force grew form 11.3 to
12.3 years of schooling, averaging a growth of 0.65 per cent per year. So on average
the attained level of schooling grew faster than the required level of schooling. This is
a slightly different picture than we presented in Van der Meer and Glebbeek (2000).
The difference is explained by the difference in base year. The difference in growth
rate between required and attained schooling could mean that in this period the
incidence and amount of overschooling has increased.
However if we look at the private and public sector separately we see a
slightly different picture. First of all we see that in every year the level of required
and attained schooling is higher in the public sector than in the private sector. In 1985
the level of required schooling in the private sector was 10.4 years whereas in the
public sector this level was 12.0 years. In 1998 the difference in years of required
schooling between the public and the private sector has grown to 2.3 years. The
difference in rate of growth can explain this increase. The required level of schooling
grew in the private sector with 0.43 per cent per year and in the public sector with
0.78 per cent per year. Despite the already high level of required schooling in the
public sector it grew faster than in the private sector. Until 1998 we did not yet see a
ceiling effect within the public sector.
Within the 13-year period the difference in the level of attained schooling of
the employees in the private and public sector declined. In 1985 the difference was
1.7 years of effective schooling whereas in 1998 this difference was 1.4 years. In this
period the level of attained schooling grew in the private sector from 10.6 with 0.76
per cent per year to 11.7 year. In the same period the level of attained schooling in the
public sector grew with 0.48 per cent per year to 13.1 year.
So in the private sector the level of attained schooling grew faster than the
level of required schooling whereas in the public sector the reverse was the case. On
the basis of these statistics one would expect that the incidence and amount of
overschooling in the private sector will have increased and in the public sector will
have decreased. In the same time the share in the labour force of public sector

employees was quite stable at 42 per cent, so from these statistics the overall
development is hard to predict.
At first sight these developments contradict our first statement which read
that in the public sector the amount of overschooling would be higher than in the
private sector. Although we have not yet looked at the incidence and amount of
overschooling yet, the developments in required and attained schooling suggest at
least that the gap between the public and private sector has become smaller. The
statistics presented in tables 3a through 3c might make us wiser.
The percentage of employees in the Dutch labour market who are
overschooled did not increase between 1985 and 1998 as can been seen in table 3a.
One can even say that between 1986 and 1998 the percentage overschooled had a
slight tendency to drop to just below one third.  This despite the differences in
development between required and attained schooling. The mean years of
overschooling shows the same trend. It seems to be quite stable around 1.40 years and
if a trend can be established it is a falling one since 1986. Because the mean years of
overschooling include the employees who are not overschooled this average is
sensitive to the number of overschooled. A drop in the percentage overschooled
should result in a drop of the mean years of overschooling. Therefore we looked at
the mean years of overschooling of the overschooled, too. The mean years of
overschooling of the overschooled is stable as well. It does not show a trend at all,
which means that the mismatch of those persons who are overschooled did not
increase or decrease. Persons who are overschooled have on average 4.2 years too
much schooling for their job.
The picture for the underschooled is almost the mirrorside of the
overschooled.  In 1998 around one third of the employees does not have enough
formal schooling to perform their job. Most likely this lack of formal schooling is
compensated by experience and on-the-job training. And although the incidence of
underschooling seems to have increased since 1985, no clear trend is visible in the
amount of underschooling. This fluctuated between 3.9 and 3.3 years of schooling.
The amount of underschooling was higher in 1998 and 1996 than in 1994, but was
highest in 1985. Although the Dutch labour market has become more tight since

1985, especially for the higher educated this is not reflected in an increase in the
amount of underschooling.
Differences in over- and underschooling between the public and private
sector can be found after studying tables 3b and 3c. In table 3b the incidence and
amount of over- and underschooling for the private sector is reported whereas table 3c
contains the results for the public sector. Surprisingly, we find a higher percentage
overschooled in the private sector than in the public sector. Therefore the mean years
of overschooling in the private sector is higher than in the public sector, too. Also
when we look at the overschooled we see that the mean years of overschooling in the
private sector is higher than in the public sector. In 1998 the mean overschooled years
in the private sector are 4.34 and only 3.87 in the public sector. The difference
between the percentage overschooled is even more striking. In the private sector we
find in 1998 40 per cent of the employees to be overschooled. In the public sector
only 24 per cent is overschooled. This certainly refutes our first hypothesis, which
stated that according to both the job-competition model and the credentialists, the
amount and incidence of overschooling would be higher in the public sector than in
the private sector.
We can give two reasons for these results. Firstly, because the level of
required schooling is higher in the public sector than in the private sector it is more
difficult to become overschooled in the public sector than in the private sector. It is
some kind of ceiling effect. If the required level of schooling is close to the ceiling
almost no one can be overschooled. Secondly, if on the other hand the human capital
theory holds for the private sector the amount and incidence of overschooling is not
that important. What counts is the productivity and the wages paid to the
overschooled. The overschooled in the private sector do not have an incentive to find
a more suitable job, because they already receive wages according to their level of
schooling. In the public sector the overschooled are not rewarded and this provides an
incentive to the overschooled to find a more suitable job. For this we have to look at
the results of the wage analyses. However before we pay attention to these results we
first want to look at the underschooled in the public and private sector.
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Looking at the public and private sector we do not see a difference in the
incidence of underschooling. In both sectors on average about one third of the
employees are underschooled. However the amount of underschooling seems to be
slightly less in the public sector than in the private sector. Reversing our first
hypothesis, which predicts more overschooling in the public than in the private sector,
we should find less underschooling in the public sector than in the private sector. This
hardly is, if at all, the case. Also in this respect we do not find support for our first
hypothesis about the difference in overschooling between the sectors.
We present the most important results5 for the various wage equations in
tables 4a, 4b and 4c. In each of these tables we present three different equations,
which makes it possible to see if the human capital model, the job-competition model
or the credentialistic view of the labour market holds within one of the sectors. In
table 4a we present the results for the entire Dutch labour market. These results do not
differ from our earlier findings (Van der Meer and Glebbeek, 2000). We see that a
mixed model, thus including required, over- and underschooling, fits the data best.
This holds for every year. Furthermore we see an increase in the rate of return on all
kinds of schooling. The rewards for required schooling as well as those for over- and
underschooling has increased, reflecting the increasing demand for labour in the
Netherlands. On average the rate of return on schooling is 7 per cent in 1998,
compared to 5 per cent in 1985. To see whether this increase is influenced by shifts in
shares of the public and private sector we first have to look at differences between
these sectors themselves. They are reported in tables 4b and 4c.
As in the entire Dutch labour market we see an increase in the rate of return
on schooling in the private sector. The rate increased from 4.3 per cent in 1985 to just
above 7 per cent in 1998. At first sight this is the same as for the entire labour market.
If we look at each of the three different models we estimated we see that also in the
private sector the combined model, including required, over- and underschooling fits
best to the data.
This refutes our second hypothesis regarding the rate of return in the private
sector. We expected to find that the model according to the human capital theory
would fit the data best. However, we do not find this. The rate of return on over- and
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underschooled years is less than on required schooling. The difference amounts to
almost one third. The results from the private sector seem not to differ from the entire
Dutch labour market, suggesting that there also will be no differences between the
public and private sector. However this still has to be tested. At this point we can say
that the expectations with regard to the effects of changes in share of the public sector
are not justified.
Looking at the public sector, see table 4c, we see that the rewards to attained
schooling is fairly stable around 6 per cent. The increase we find for the entire market
and in the private sector is not repeated in the public sector. However as in the private
sector the mixed model fits best the data. This means at least that Thurow’s job-
competition model is rejected as mechanism that regulates the allocation and wage
process in the public sector. Neither the rewards to overschooling nor the rewards to
underschooling are nil. So our only rescue now is the credentialistic hypothesis.
For the credentialistic view to hold at least the rate of return on overschooling should
be higher in the public sector than in the private sector. We also stipulated that if this
holds it is very likely that also the rate of return on required schooling, in the mixed
model, or on attained schooling should be higher in the public sector than in the
private sector. Comparing table 4b to table 4c again we cannot corroborate our
hypothesis. Although the results for the early 1980’s look promising we see that in
later years the differences between the public and private sector disappear and even
start to become contrary to the expectations. Whereas in 1985 the rate of return on
attained and overschooling seems to be higher in the public than in the private sector
the situation seems to be reversed in 1996 and 1998.
A formal test on these differences reveals that only in a few years the public
and private sector show significant differences in the rate of return on schooling. In
1985 and 1986 the rewards for required and the punishment for underschooling are
higher in the public than in the private sector, but the rate of return on overschooling
is the same. 1988 and 1994 reveal no differences at all, whereas in 1996 the rate of
return on required and underschooling is higher in the private sector than in the public
sector. Again the rate of return on the overschooled years is the same for both sectors.
In 1998 the rewards for all kinds of schooling are the same in both sectors. So, with


these results in hand we must also reject the view of the credentialists. In not even one
single year is the rate of return on overschooling higher in the public sector than in
the private sector. 1986 came closest with a t-value of 1.94 (p=0.052). The trend also
is contrary to the expectations of the credentialists. The public sector showed in the
eighties a higher reward for schooling than the private sector, in the nineties this was
reversed.
Overlooking our results we must conclude that none of our hypotheses is
confirmed by the data. This also means that we cannot explain the changes in the rate
of return on required, over- and underschooling by changes in the shares of the public
and private sector in the Dutch labour market. We do not even have to look at the
changes in these shares. In our samples the proportion of public sector employees
varied between 39.5 per cent in 1986 and 44.6 per cent in 1998. As mentioned earlier
the share of public sector workers is rather stable than declining. Sector differences
and changes herein do not provide an answer to our main question.
& '""		
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In this paper we investigated if we could explain the differences in rewards between
required schooling on the one hand and over- and underschooling on the other hand
(Hartog, 2000; Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000; Van der Meer and Glebbeek,
2000) by differences in the private and public sector. We also tried to explain the
recent trend in the rewards for this schooling by changes in the shares of the public
and private sector. The underlying idea is that within a bureaucracy, as the public
sector, workers and employees are more often overschooled and suffer from
credentials inflation while workers and employees in the private sector are rewarded
according to their productivity. We proposed the idea that the wage and allocation
processes in the private sector would behave more according to the human capital
theory while in the public sector these processes would behave more according to
Thurow’s job-competition model or to the ideas put forward by the credentialists.
However, we could not find support for neither of these ideas in the Dutch Labour

Supply Panel Study of the Dutch Institute for Labour Studies (OSA). All the
hypotheses we proposed were rejected by the data. This came not entirely as a
surprise. Given the ‘common’ results for the entire labour market it was not to be
expected that the credentialistic view would hold.
We found some differences between the sectors with regard to the level of
required schooling of the jobs and the level of attained schooling of the employees
and also differences in the incidence and amount of overschooling. These differences,
however, were opposite our expectations. Employees in the private sector were more
often overschooled than the ones in the public sector. We could not find differences in
the rewards for overschooling, the proof of the pudding. Neither is the rate of return
on overschooling smaller in the public sector than in the private sector, as predicted
by the job-competition model, nor the other way around as predicted by the
credentialists. We also did not find proof for the human capital theory that predicts
that the rewards for required and overschooling is the same. Also in the private sector
the mixed model produces the best fit. So we are not able to explain the mixed results
found for the entire labour market.
How bad are these results? How should we interpret these? Well in our view
we are not that unhappy with the rejection of these hypotheses. First of all it means
that neither the human capital theory, the job-competition model nor the credentialist
hypothesis is confirmed. In the search for an explanation of the wage setting and
allocation process on the labour market we have to find other models. One such
model is the matching model proposed by Hartog (2000) to explain the differences in
rates of return on required and overschooling. As in our earlier paper (Van der Meer
and Glebbeek, 2000) the matching model outperforms both the human capital theory
and the job-competition model. However, other alternatives could be found in
efficiency wages, insider-outsider models or other models elaborated on
microeconomic or rational choice theory. Albeit these models have to be elaborated to
explain the stylised facts.
Secondly it means that all the investments, both privately and publicly, in
education and formal schooling are not wasted. We have no substantial proof for
credentials inflation as advocated by others (Asselbergh a.o., 1998; Conen a.o., 1983;

Wolbers, 1998), not even in the public sector. If workers and employees have more
schooling than necessary to do their job well, they get paid and recoup their
investment. The increase in the rate of return on schooling shows that the investments
in education even have become more rewarding, despite the enormous increase in the
level of schooling in the Dutch labour market.
An alternative explanation for our findings might be that because of budget
cuts in the public sector and because of the threat or preparation for privatisation the
public sector was forced to become more efficient and more alike the private sector.
So the difference in wages and allocation between the public and private sector have
disappeared. This is supported by the differences in the rate of return on schooling in
the mid-eighties, which disappeared later on. However, because of the growth of the
service sector, also within the private sector, it might be argued that the private sector
has become more alike the public sector. Both in public and in private services the
(marginal) labour productivity is difficult to measure and it is therefor difficult to set
wages according to productivity. So for one reason or another the two sectors have




 The wage equation which has become the standard in labour economics which was first
proposed by Mincer (1974)
2
 OSA is short for Organisatie voor Strategisch Arbeidsmarktonderzoek (Institute for Labour
Studies)
3
 The private sector contains the codes of the Dutch ‘Standaard Bedrijdsindeling’: 011, 012,
014, 015, 030, 120, 126, 191, 193, 199, 200-374, 376-394, 399, 510-689, 692, 699, 722, 723,
730-732, 741, 742, 751-763, 803, 810-824, 832-859, 929, 935-937, 956, 980, 982-985, 990,
991. The public sector contains the codes: 020, 110, 375, 395, 400-4999, 710, 721, 724, 770,
831, 901-907, 910-913, 919, 920-928, 931-934, 938, 939, 940-955, 957-959, 969, 970-979,
981, 989.
4
 We selected those persons who at the time of the interview were in paid employment (Dutch
in loondienst). As usual elsewhere unemployed and self-employed are left out of the analysis.
5
 Upon request the full results are available from the author.
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Table 2. The mean years of required and attained schooling for the entire Dutch
labour market and for the private and public sector for six different years
Total 1985 1986 1988 1994 1996 1998
Required schooling 11.1 10.9 11.2 11.5 11.6 12.0
Attained schooling 11.3 11.3 11.5 11.9 11.8 12.3
N 1831 1781 1883 1926 2102 1945
Private sector
Required schooling 10.4 10.2 10.3 10.6 10.7 11.0
Attained schooling 10.6 10.6 10.9 11.3 11.2 11.7
N 1076 1077 1089 1112 1240 1077
Public sector
Required schooling 12.0* 12.0* 12.4* 12.8* 12.8* 13.3*
Attained schooling 12.3* 12.3* 12.4* 12.7* 12.6* 13.1*
N 755 704 794 814 862 868
Source: OSA, own calculations.
* Differs significantly from the private sector
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Table 3a. The incidence and amount of over- and underschooling in the 	 labour
market for six different years
1985 1986 1988 1994 1996 1998
Percentage
overschooled
32.7 34.8 33.7 33.6 33.4 32.9
Mean years of
overschooling




4.23 4.20 4.18 4.14 4.14 4.19
Percentage
underschooled
30.6 28.6 30.9 31.8 33.1 33.0
Mean years of
underschooling




3.91 3.83 3.50 3.29 3.64 3.38
Number of cases 1831 1781 1883 1926 2102 1945
Source: OSA, own calculations.
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Table 3b. The incidence and amount of over- and underschooling in the 
	
labour market for six different years
1985 1986 1988 1994 1996 1998
Percentage
overschooled
34.4 36.8 37.3 39.8 38.9 40.4
Mean years of
overschooling




4.25 4.30 4.36 4.34 4.29 4.34
Percentage
underschooled
31.7 29.5 29.1 30.0 32.8 32.6
Mean years of
underschooling




4.10 3.95 3.65 3.47 3.79 3.47
Number of cases 1076 1077 1089 1112 1240 1077
Source: OSA, own calculations.
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Table 3c. The incidence and amount of over- and underschooling in the  labour
market for six different years
1985 1986 1988 1994 1996 1998
Percentage
overschooled
30.5 31.8 28.7 25.2 25.6 23.5
Mean years of
overschooling




4.20 4.02 3.86 3.69 3.83 3.87
Percentage
underschooled
29.1 27.3 33.3 34.2 33.5 33.4
Mean years of
underschooling




3.61 3.64 3.33 3.06 3.43 3.28
Number of cases 755 704 794 814 862 868
Source: OSA, own calculations.
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Table 4a. The rate of return of attained, required, over- and underschooling in the
	 labour market for six different years, (|t-values|). Results from OLS-
regressions on ln (wage) with controls for experience, experience square, marital
status times gender and ln(hours worked).














Adj. R2 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.49 0.43














Adj. R2 0.40 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.46 0.41






































Adj. R2 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.52 0.47
s.e. estimate 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.29
Number of cases 1831 1781 1883 1926 2102 1945
Source: OSA, own calculations.
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Table 4b. The rate of return of attained, required, over- and underschooling in the

	 labour market for six different years, (|t-values|). Results from OLS-
regressions on ln (wage) with controls for experience, experience square, marital
status times gender and ln(hours worked).














Adj. R2 0.40 0.41 0.48 0.52 0.54 0.44














Adj. R2 0.38 0.42 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.43






































Adj. R2 0.44 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.57 0.49
s.e. estimate 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.30
Number of cases 1076 1077 1089 1112 1240 1077
Source: OSA, own calculations.
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Table 4c. The rate of return of attained, required, over- and underschooling in the
  labour market for six different years, (|t-values|). Results from OLS-
regressions on ln (wage) with controls for experience, experience square, marital
status times gender and ln(hours worked).














Adj. R2 0.48 0.49 0.43 0.48 0.36 0.33














Adj. R2 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.46 0.37 0.31






































Adj. R2 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.52 0.41 0.38
s.e. estimate 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.27 0.26
Number of cases 755 704 794 814 862 868
Source: OSA, own calculations.
